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“The advantage to mankind of being able to trust 
one another, penetrates into every crevice and 
cranny of human life: the economical is perhaps the 
smallest part of it, yet even this is incalculable”  
(J. S. Mill (1848/2004)) 
 
Abstract 
According to the modern theory of social capital (see Coleman (1990), Putnam (1993), 
Fukuyama (1995)), widespread trust would influence the economic performances of a 
country through a) reduction of transactional costs (monitoring and preventive 
activities to protect themselves from being exploited in economic transactions) and 
legal disputes; b) higher percentage of time devoted to innovation in new products or 
processes; c) higher reliability of formal institutions like the government and the central 
bank which implies that people can adopt more appropriate horizons in making 
investment decisions and choose production technologies that are optimal over the 
long, rather than short, run; d) a stronger social cohesion due to the sharing of ethical 
norms which induces cooperative behaviours and organisational innovations. On the 
basis of these theories a large number of empirical contributions which confirm the 
existence of a positive relation between growth, efficiency and the level of trust has been 
produced. Following the seminal work by Knack et al. (ibidem), we try to explain 
growth in Brazil over the period 2000-2003 using indicators of social capital. We 
develop our analysis at the most detailed geographical level, considering all 5507 
municipalities. This choice is motivated by the great heterogeneity inside every country 
in terms of growth rate. While we observe homogeneity in some countries, like Sergipe, 
in other countries, like Sao Paulo, we have huge differences. This forces us to consider 
the municipalities as unit of observation; otherwise the country level would force us to 
loose all the heterogeneity. In order to obtain good measures of social capital, we start 
from a set of objective measure, and then analyse then with factor component analysis. 
We find a robust evidence of the positive effect of social capital on growth rates of 
income per capita. 
 
                                                 
♣ We would like to thank  partecipants at II DYNREG Workshop (9-10 March 2007, Athens) and ISLA seminar for 
their helpful comments and suggestions. 1. Introduction 
 
This work aims at investigating the role of social capital on economic performance. In order to 
achieve this objective, we consider extensively the previous literature on social capital, in order to 
draw testable predictions. According to the modern theory of social capital (see Coleman (1990), 
Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995)), widespread trust would influence the economic performances of 
a country via several channels. Firstly, it implies a reduction of transactional costs (monitoring and 
preventive activities to protect themselves from being exploited in economic transactions) and legal 
disputes. Secondly, it allows a higher percentage of time devoted to innovation in new products or 
processes. Thirdly, social capital implies higher reliability of formal institutions like the government 
and the central bank, which in turn implies that people can adopt more appropriate horizons in 
making investment decisions and choose production technologies that are optimal over the long, 
rather than short, run. Finally, a stronger social cohesion due to the sharing of ethical norms induces 
cooperative behaviours and organisational innovations.  
On the basis of these theories a large number of empirical contributions which confirm the 
existence of a positive relation between growth, efficiency and the level of trust has been produced 
(including Putnam (ibidem) and Fukuyama (ibidem), the reader can also refer to Heliwell et al. 
(1995), Keefer et al. (1997), Knack et al. (2001), La Porta et al (1997)). 
Following the seminal work by Knack et al. (ibidem), we try to explain growth in Brazil over 
the period 2000-2003 using indicators of social capital. We develop our analysis at the most 
detailed geographical level, considering all 5507 municipalities. This choice is motivated by the 
great heterogeneity inside every country in terms of growth rate. While we observe homogeneity in 
some countries, like Sergipe, in other countries, like Sao Paulo, we have huge differences. This 
forces us to consider the municipalities as unit of observation; otherwise the country level would 
force us to loose all the heterogeneity. 
In order to obtain good measures of social capital, we start from a large set of social indicators, 
and then analyse them with factor component analysis. We find a robust evidence of the positive 
effect of social capital on growth rates of income per capita. The paper is structured as follows: 
section 2 present the review of the literature, section 3 the model specification, the data and the 




 2. Review of the Literature on Social Capital 
2.1. Civil Society and Civil Economy 
 
We live in a time in which both the ideal concepts of state and market have failed to fulfil our 
expectations of an “ordered” life and a rich existence. Political and ideological walls break down 
while the assumptions upon which capitalism finds its sense reveal connotations which appear im-
moral rather than a-moral. Much worse, they both fail in guide people in taking their daily 
decisions. As Alan Wolfe points out (Wolfe [2000]), neither the market nor a vague concept of state 
can offer an adequate theory of moral obligation which delimits our freedom of action and which 
makes the coexistence with our neighbours possible. 
Obviously, accusing both the state and the market of being inefficient and useless does not 
represent a credible solution since it totally omits to consider what these entities are and why we 
still need them. Indeed, they are by-products of our social life and they hide deep characteristics of 
our culture and our social values. As Bellah clearly states “we are not self-created atoms 
manipulating or being manipulated by objective institutions. We form institutions and they form us 
every time we engage in a conversation that matters” (Bellah [2000], page 76).  
These institutions were created in order to establish an ordered and efficient social life 
addressed to a wide definition of “common good” which reflects our cultural connotations. 
Therefore, rather than theorising an anarchic society without these institutions, a more sensate 
solution would be to give them back their civil and civic meaning. 
The question remains open: if social life influences institutions and institutions are so important 
for social life that we cannot imagine a world without them, do social scientists have any chance to 
theorise normative indications to guide this self-perpetuating system? As soon as this question 
became more and more incisive, the idea of a virtuous self-governing community composed by 
individuals linked one another through a strong sense of mutual obligation (re)appeared in the 
literature and offered new elements to reinterpret those old and inefficient institutions. 
Sometimes thinkers use the expression “civil society” in a reductive way to identify the set 
composed by the voluntary associations which are placed between the state and the individual 
(Durkheim [1893/1997], page 28). 
However, the most of the times the concept of civil society seems to be melt with the deepest 
idea of “good society” which “differs from that of the civil one in that while the former also 
strongly favors voluntary associations – a rich and strong social fabric, and civility of discourse – it 
formulates and seeks to uphold some particular social conception of the good. The good society is 
[…] centered around a core of substantive, particularistic values. For instance, different societies foster different values or at least give much more normative weight to some values than other 
societies that exhibit a commitment to the same values” (Etzioni [2000], page132).   
As Alexis De Toqueville addressed more than two hundreds years ago in his “Democracy in 
America” (De Toqueville [1835/2000]), the community becomes the main generator of moral 
values, norms of cooperation and “common good.”  Neither the state nor the market can substitute 
the community in finding its identity and in defining its ends. Americans voluntary created clubs, 
religious associations, churches, fraternal order to serve their private interests and their specific 
needs. However, in addiction to these specific objectives, they also triggered a virtuous process of 
learning the essential habits of cooperation and trust. In economic terms, they created social capital 
in the form of social ties, a flourishing democratic life and a feeling of mutual obligation. Using a 
coloured expression, De Toqueville says that Americans had found the secret key upon which “the 
progress of all the rest depends.” 
The neo-Toquevillean theorist Robert Putnam uses the same thesis of civic behaviour of 
citizens used by the French author to explain both the economic and social development in Italy. In 
his article “The Prosperous Community” (Putnam [1993]), he  firstly defines social capital as “the 
features of social organization, such as networks, norms, trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit” (page 35) and then he uses this concept to compare the northern 
regions with the southern regions on the basis of the level of civic engagement –voter turnout, 
newspaper readership, membership in clubs, associations, churches and other realities. As result, the 
growth rate of the northern regions would have been stimulated by the virtuous civil life 
dramatically. 
On the basis of this line of research, Putnam clearly states in his “Bowling Alone” (Putnam 
[1995]) that the decline in the civic engagement represents one of the most dangerous aspect of the 
modern social life in USA. He finds that by almost every measure, Americans engagement in 
politics, in religious associations, in labour unions, in the parent-teacher association, in civic and 
fraternal organizations has fallen steadily and sharply over the last generation. The author concludes 
that the erosion of social capital over time could even undermine the economic performance of 
United States. 
Rather than offering a further definition of a concept which probably cannot be defined, we 
focus our attention on distinctive aspects which of the concept of civil society. Firstly, we describe 
an alternative concept of rationality used by an individual to act in a cooperative way and to 
establish mutual obligations. Secondly, we present a new theory of reciprocity based on the 
assumption that individuals are anonymous. Finally, we stress the importance of widespread trust 
which probably represents the most important by-product of a virtuous coexistence based on mutual assistance. In particular, we offer an explanation of how trust can spread among man and among 
different activities.  
 
 
2.2. Rationality and Civil Society: Rational Egoism, Kantianism, and We-Rationality 
 
The concept of “rational egoism” is the most important assumption to explain how an 
individual behaves when he faces a situation of choice. The two words describe a unique vision of a 
man who is rational if and only if he maximises his utility function taking into account both his 
budget constraint and the decisions of the other individuals. Unfortunately, with the development of 
the modern game theory, the operational limits of this assumption started being highlighted 
dramatically. The typical situation used to describe the implications of the assumption of rational 
egoism in human interaction is the well known public good game. An individual can benefit from 
the public good contributed by his community regardless of whether he contributes to its provision. 
Therefore, he has not any incentive to contribute towards the public good. Since the same holds for 
everybody in the community, an inefficiently low quantity of public good is provided.  
Antonio Genovesi, contemporary of Hume and Smith, proposed the first concrete alternative to 
the assumption of rational egoism. According to the author, given a universal human desire for 
social relationship, economic and political cooperation is rational in the same sense that friendship 
is since it makes possible to reach what he called the “public happiness”  (Genovesi [1766/1973]), 
where the adjective “public” captures the structural nature of happiness: happiness has to be public 
otherwise it is not happiness. 
As Bruni and Sugden [2000] have suggested “the most useful framework to use [to understand 
Genovesi] is the rationality of we-rationality as advocates by Hollis” (page 26). In his “Trust within 
Reason” (Hollis 1998) Hollis proposes his definition of we-rationality. He says: “Adam can decide 
what to do by reflecting that the good of the team requires Adam to do a and Eve to do e, and then 
threat this as an unconditional reason to do his bit. It no longer worries him that he does well to do a 
only if Eve will indeed do e, because Eve will have a similarly unconditional reason for doing e as 
her bit. Each now has the assurance that the other will not wait to contribute” (page 137). Then, he 
stresses the importance that individuals recognise themselves as members of the same body: “to 
prevent conditionals from resurfacing, team membership needs to be a stronger relation than 
membership of a mere association. One way to make the point is to say that members of teams have 
‘we-intentions’: each, if asked ‘what do you intend to do?’, replies ‘We intend to keep left.’ This 
will be no small innovation, if we-intentions presuppose we-desires and we-beliefs, in shorts if teams or groups can be agents only if they have relevant attributes of individual agents” (page 138). 
Once having accepted that being a person means belonging to a community, it is clear both why and 
how a person behaves cooperatively in favour of the well-being of the group. 
Accepting the “we-rationality” as a principle of action leaves open another crucial question on 
the definition of the community of reference. One suggestion is proposed by Hollis. When he 
explains the differences between the concept of team and the weaker one of, for example, the 
association he says: “one [way to conceive of team and of actions done for the good of the team] is 
to think of the team as an entity transcending its members, with a group which transcends and 
determines theirs” (page 138). And later he continues: “[…] the we is neither a sum of associated 
individuals nor all humanity but a matter of membership. Titmuss is right, I think, to call the 
practice one of ‘gifts between the strangers’ but these are relative strangers – unknown members of 
our network” (page 147). 
Whatever the definition of the “others” consists of, it implicitly refers to a situation in which a 
group of individuals are, using an economic expression, strategically interconnected to each other. 
This idea is well-captured by the definition of group assumed by Sugden in his model of 
reciprocity. He says: “The individual has an obligations, not to ‘society’ but to any groups of 
individuals from whose efforts he derives benefits. Groups need not be formally constituted 
organisations. The groups that have claims on the individual may be occupational, racial, religious 
or political; they may be local, national or international.” (Sugden [1984], page 775).  
 
 
2.3. Social Reciprocity and Anonymous Contributors 
 
Once defined the concept we-rationality, Hollis asks a crucial question: “why do people who 
contribute to public goods fret about free-riders in some cases but not others?” (page 147). The 
answer he proposes highlights a new definition of social reciprocity which is particularly coherent 
with the concept of civil society. He says: “There is a logic of ‘enough’, I submit, which can 
overcome the dominance of defection, provided that a sense of membership is in play. […] Thus, 
public goods which depend on creative altruism are a matter both of a large enough total to secure 
the good and of enough contributors for mutual reassurance that contributing is a worthy activity.” 
Starting from Hollis’ logic of enough, we build a theory of social reciprocity. 
Suppose that Mr. Jeaves is taking a walk in a public park and he finds a plastic bag on the 
ground. He has to decide whether to pick the bag up, contributing to the quality of the park but 
spending a bit of effort to find a bin, or to leave the plastic bag where he has found it. It is reasonable to expect that Mr. Jeaves’ decision would be influenced by the actual state of the park: 
the cleaner it is, the higher the chance that Mr. Jeaves will pick the bag up, contributing towards the 
respect of nature.  
Mr Jeaves’ behaviour is an example of what we define as “social reciprocity.” With this 
expression we refer to those situations in which, by observing a “sufficiently high” level of public 
good, anonymous and unobserved individuals are induced to contribute more than what is usually 
predicted by the public good models. According to this class of models, in deciding how much to 
contribute towards a specific social project which affects the well-being of all the contributors, 
individuals are inexorably bound to fall into “free-riding” and exhibit the “crowding-out” in 
personal contribution (see e.g. Andreoni [1988]). The puzzle given by the empirical invalidation of 
these results (in addiction to Andreoni’s paper, see e.g. Sugden [1982] and Rose-Ackerman [1996]) 
has driven economists to take part in the discussion, by building reasonable and elegant models of 
reciprocal contributions.   
Although the economic literature nowadays boasts a large number of these theories, none of 
them can be easily applied to the concept of “social reciprocity.”  
Consider for instance the “Inequity Aversion” hypothesis. Extending their theory to many 
contexts (the public good game being one of them), Fehr and Schmidt [1999] assume that an 
individual is induced to cooperate with other players, whose material payoffs are below an equitable 
benchmark (defined as an equal monetary payoff for all players), but he feels envy when their 
material payoffs exceed this level. However, the implicit assumption of perfect knowledge, which 
allows individuals to compare others’ payoffs with the benchmark, makes this theory not applicable 
to a context in which people can observe only the total amount of public good collected until that 
moment. Moreover, as stressed by Bardsley [2000], one of the most doubtful predictions implied by 
the theory when used to explain private contributions to a public good is that individuals with less 
than the average income are very likely to behave as free riders because they would experiment 
disadvantageous inequality (page 214). This implication seems not to be confirmed by the empirical 
evidence on public goods. For instance, Andreoni [1988] reports that, according to the results of 
three surveys on the American philanthropic sector in the seventies, over 85% of all the American 
households support “big” charities with their voluntary donations. Moreover, the average giving is 
over $200 per household. This shows that the percentage of households who consistently contribute 
to charities is much higher than the percentage of households with more than the average income. 
Another interesting theory of reciprocity is presented in Rabin [1993]. Rabin assumes that 
individuals’ willingness to cooperate depends on the kindness showed by the persons they are 
interacting with (page 1282). Unfortunately, it can only be applied to simple two-persons, normal-form, complete-information games. As directly suggested by Rabin, an extension to the public good 
context appears doubtful from the psychological point of view since, in deciding the amount to 
contribute, an individual is forced “[…] to choose either to help everybody or to hurt everybody.” 
This leads the author to the question: “does one contribute to reward those who have contributed or 
not contribute to punish those who have not contributed?” (page 1296). 
The theory here presented directly refers to the social reciprocity context. Indeed, we assume 
that individuals contribute their “fair” contribution when they consider that particular behaviour as 
correct, otherwise they continue behaving as free-riders. This behavioural assumption arises at least 
two questions. Firstly, what kind of psychological process do individuals follow in order to judge 
the correctness of a particular social behaviour? Secondly, how can they define a fair contribution 
under the assumption of it being anonymous and unobservable? 
Cialdini’s theory of “Social proof” represents a good answer to the first question. According to 
Cialdini [2001], “[…] we view a behaviour as correct in a given situation to the degree that we see 
others performing it” (page 95). Moreover, by interpreting Cialdini’s theory in terms of social 
reciprocity,  it suggests a sort of “Crowding-in” effect, which is not based on any kind of 
discernability of personal contributions. When an individual has to choose whether to contribute 
fairly or selfishly, he will base his decision on what the other members of his society have done, 
even if he knows that his contribution will remain completely indistinguishable within the total 
amount of public good. However, since the same holds for everybody, the only information each 
individual can use to infer how the others have behaved is the total quantity of public good 
collected. 
We model this psychological process by assuming that different people respond differently to 
the “social proof” described before. There are people who start a particular project motivated by 
their ideals regardless of what the rest of the world does: people who create new NGOs, leaders of 
religious, political, social movements and so on. On the contrary there are individuals who decide 
not to conform to the generalised behaviour with the purpose of taking personal advantage. 
Between these two extreme classes of individuals, there exist people who decide to contribute on 
the basis of the existing level of the public good. One way to introduce this difference in an 
economic theory is to assume that each individual is characterised by his personal “attitude to 
contribute fairly,” which simply expresses the proportion of fair contributors he would like to 
observe so as to be induced to contribute “fairly.” However, since nobody in the society can observe 
other personal contributions, we can imagine that each individual applies a simple inferential 
procedure through which he can infer the proportion of fair contributors by observing the level of 
public good. If the inferred parameter is greater than his personal attitude to fairness, then he contributes his fair contribution. In other words, when an individual considers that “enough” people 
have acted cooperatively, then he joins the “teamwork,” contributing what should be optimal to 
contribute if everybody did the same. The definition of “enough” represents a personal 
characteristic; it can vary from a level associated with an unconditional team-thinker who always 
acts for the benefits of the community to a level associated with an unconditional egoist who always 
behaves as a free-rider. 
Now consider the second question, the problem of defining a “fair contribution.” 
Although Sugden’s theory of reciprocity (Sugden [1984]) is based on the (already discussed) 
assumption of common knowledge of personal contributions, it contains a little recognised and 
crucial point which my theory shares: in deciding their contribution towards the public good, 
individuals are always able to define an unconditional, “fair” contribution that they should 
contribute regardless of what the others do. Sugden defines individual’s obligation to contribute in 
the following way: “For any vector of contributions q, for any group of individuals  , and for any 
member of that group  :   is meeting his obligation to   if and only if either (a)   or (b) for some other 
person   in  ,  ” (page 777) where   is the level of contribution that   would choose if he could choose 
it for all members of  . 
 Sometimes economists  refer to this amount as the “Kantian contribution”. According to the 
concept of Kantian categorical imperative  adapted to the public good context, an individual should 
firstly define the amount he would like others to contribute if they were in his circumstances and, 
secondly, contribute that amount regardless of what the others do. It is clear that the main 
implication of this concept, particularly applicable to a context characterised by anonymous and 
unobservable contributors, is that an individual is able to determine his fair contribution even if he 
cannot compare it with others’ contributions. 
Given the definition of Kantian contribution, it is reasonable to assume that an individual 
contributes fairly if his contribution is equal to the higher of the Kantian contribution and the self-
interested one. Indeed, if the Kantian contribution is lower than the self-interested one (as it is 
formally possible given the heterogeneity I am going to discuss), there is not any “ethical or logic” 
reason why the individual should refuse to contribute the amount which maximising his utility 





 2.4. Widespread Trust and Economic Performance 
 
As clarified by Bruni and Sugden [2000], Genovesi defines “Fede Pubblica” (literally public 
trust) as a common and mutually-recognised commitment to the virtues of friendship and reciprocal 
assistance where these two expressions basically refer to the concept of reciprocity under the 
principle of we-rationality.  In the appendix of his “Lezioni” (Genovesi [1765-1767/1820]), 
Genovesi clarifies, “This word, fides, means rope, which ties and joins. Public trust is, therefore, the 
bond of families united in a friendly life.” This entity was so important for Genovesi that “[…] 
nothing is more necessary than public trust in a wide and easy circulation [...]. Trust is for civil 
bodies what the law of gravity is for natural bodies [...]. There, because of lack of trust, there is no 
reciprocal reliability, no society, no industry and no trade among peoples” (Lezioni, II, cap. X, p. 
148-149).  
In other words, for Genovesi, widespread trust has two main characteristics: a) it is produced by 
a virtuous community of individuals who share a feeling of mutual obligations and, b) it spreads its 
effects in every human activity. Given these premises, Genovesi’s main suggestion to the governors 
of Naples was to cultivate the public trust in order to stimulate the economic performances of the 
country. One mechanism through which the governors would have obtained this ambitious result 
was to encourage and the civil and the religious education of the citizens. 
The concept of trust used by Fukuyama in his book is not dissimilar from the one offered by 
Genovesi. In particular Fukuyama refers to an “alchemic” combination of two elements which 
characterise a society: a generalised tendency to cooperate and a shared morality based on the 
cultural connotations of the society. He defines trust as “the expectation that arises within a 
community of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the 
part of other members of that community. Those norms can be about deep “value” questions like 
the nature of God or justice, but they also encompass secular norms like professional standards and 
codes of behaviour” (Fukuyama [1995], page 26). 
The virtuous consequence of high level of trust is social capital. Indeed he says: “Social capital 
is a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it.” After 
having defined both the concepts of trust and social capital, he states the indissoluble linkage 
between them and the culture of the society. He says: “Social capital differs from other forms of 
human capital insofar as it is usually created and transmitted through cultural mechanism” where 
culture is defined as an inherited ethical habit. Then, he states the importance of considering the 
cultural characteristics of a community in delimiting the ethical habits. He says that “[…] the most 
important habits that make up cultures have […] to do with the ethical codes by which societies regulate behaviour – what the philosopher Nietzsche called a people’s ‘language of good and evil’. 
Despite their variety, all cultures seek to constrain the raw selfishness of human nature in some 
fashion through the establishment of unwritten moral rules” (Fukuyama [1995], page 34). 
Given this definition of trust, we now explain how the level of trust can affect the economic 
performances. The idea that widespread trust can influence economic performances has always 
been accepted by economists. For instance, in his “Principles of Political Economy,” J. S. Mill 
pointed that “the advantage to mankind of being able to trust one another, penetrates into every 
crevice and cranny of human life: the economical is perhaps the smallest part of it, yet even this is 
incalculable” (Mill [1848/2004], page 131). Moreover, there is a large number of empirical 
contributions which confirm the positive correlation between growth, efficiency and the level of 
trust (including the findings of Putnam [1993] and the cultural considerations of Fukuyama [1995], 
one can also refer to Heliwell et al. [1995], Keefer et al. [1997], Knack et al. [2001]).  
According to the theorists of social capital, the channels through which trust would influence 
the economic performance of the country are: a) reduction of transactional costs (monitoring and 
preventive activities to protect themselves from being exploited in economic transactions) and legal 
disputes; b) higher percentage of time devoted to innovation in new products or processes; c) higher 
reliability of formal institutions like the government and the central bank which implies that people 
can adopt more appropriate horizons in making investment decisions and choose production 
technologies that are optimal over the long, rather than short, run; d) a stronger feeling of teamwork 
due to the sharing of ethical norms which induces cooperative behaviours and organisational 
innovations.  
Although economists have always assumed that there exists a positive relation between trust 
and economic performance, they have rarely investigated on how this strong linkage can be 
explained theoretically. In this paper, since we have indirectly treated the concept of civil society in 
terms of a typical situation in which individuals are asked to cooperate in order to enjoy a 
reasonable level of public good, we should clarify how trust, intended as the virtuous product of 
cooperative individuals, can spread and positively influence the economic performance of the 
community. This is an old thesis which clearly appears in the thought of modern economists. For 
instance, in his “Nature of Rationality” (Nozick [1994]), Nozick says: “Cooperating in [the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma] situation then may get grouped with other activities of cooperation […]. 
Hence, non cooperating in this particular Prisoner’s Dilemma situation may come to threaten a 
person’s cooperating in those other situations – the line between them may not be so salient.”  How 
to justify theoretically this kind of, using Elster’s language, spillover effect (Elster 1998)? Sugden’s 
mechanism of “diffusion by analogy” (Sugden 1989) can be used to answer this question. He says: “A convention can start to evolve as soon as some people believe that other people are following it. 
But what gives rise this initial belief? One possibility is that the same forces are at work as enable 
people to coordinate their actions without communication in unrepeated games. Some forms of 
coordination are more prominent than others, and people have a prior expectation of finding the 
most prominent ones. But, […] prominence is largely a matter of common experience. The 
implication is that conventions may spread by analogy from one context to another. If it is a matter 
of common knowledge that a particular convention is followed in one situation, then that 
convention acquires prominence for other, analogues situations. […] [Finally], if conventions can 
spread by analogy, then the conventions that are best able to spread are those that are most 
susceptible to analogy. Thus we should expect to find family of relationships among conventions, 
and not just a chaos of arbitrary and unrelated rules” (page 93). 
In other words, if people learn to cooperate in collecting public good, then it is reasonable that 
the same attitude will spread “by analogy” to the productive sector in which everybody is involved. 
Individual work becomes more productive because of a higher coordination and a higher 
cooperation with colleagues and, moreover, production becomes more efficient because of a 
considerable reduction in transaction costs. 
 
 
3 Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Specification 
 
In the empirical analysis we focus on the role of social capital on economic performance. 
Among the others, we want to test whether, and to what extent, social capital is a determinant of 
economic growth. In order to implement this analysis, we will estimate the following reduced form 
equation: 
i i i i cap soc GDPpct GDPpc ε γ β α + + + = ∆ _ 0  
where the dependent variable is the change over time in the logarithm of income per capita. As 
explanatory variable, we will employ the logarithm of income per capita in the initial time period, 
which allows us to control if absolute convergence is taking place. We add a set of different 




 3.2 Data Description and Methodology 
 
In order to test this prediction, we focus our empirical analysis on Brazil. As regards data on 
GDP per capita, we have information at the municipality level for all the years ranging from 1999 to 
2003. These data come from the Pequisa de Informaçoes Basicas Municapais, which is an annual 
survey sent to all municipalities by IBGE, the Brasilian Institute for Geography and Statistics. 
Social capital variable come mainly form the 2000 Census by IBGE, on 169,799,170 individuals. 
As these variables lack time dimension, we are forced to implement a cross section regression. 
Nonetheless, we can exploit the cross section variability as we have data on 5507 municipalities.  
We choose to exploit this level of disaggregation mainly because we observe huge variations of 
our dependent variable within each State. Figure 1 shows kernel densities for the growth rate of 
GDP per capita over the period 2000-2003, plotted by State.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
We can clearly observe that States are largely heterogeneous as regards growth rates of 
Municipalities. While we observe homogeneity in some countries, like Sergipe, in other countries, 
like Sao Paulo, we have huge differences.
1 Therefore, we can affirm that reducing the analysis at 
the State level implies loosing information given by heterogeneity.  
We would regress the variation of GDP per capita over the interval 1999-2003 on the level of 
GDP per capita in the initial time period and a number of social capital indicators. As in1999 Brazil 
faced currency crisis, we consider a safer choice to implement our analysis starting from year 2000. 
Nonetheless, the main results on the role of social capital are robust using 1999 as starting year, as 
shown in the robustness analysis.  
We build our measure of social capital using factor analysis. This methodology is able to 
extract from a large number of variables just few factors, which linearly reconstruct the original 
variables. This technique presents many advantages. First, it helps reducing a variable set to a 
manageable size. Second, it is useful to understand the structure underlying a set of variables, via 
the interpretation of the factor loadings. Third, it is appropriate to measure a complex concept, or a 
concept that cannot be measured directly, which is exactly the case of social capital.  
The variables used to extract the different factors are listed in Appendix A, while Table 1 
presents the correlation matrix between social capital variables. We find that the correlations 
                                                 
1 Distrito Federal is missing, as this State is contains only one municipality: Brasilia. between social factors are generally highly significant,
2 while the coefficients are not large in size, 
thus suggesting that they are capturing different aspects of social capital, and are not simply 
replicating the same underlying phenomena. Therefore, we feel confident while using these 
regressors together in the same estimating equation.  
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 
4. Results and Robusteness 
 
We start our empirical analysis performing an exploratory analysis on patterns of growth in 
Brazil. Table 2 shows the results regressing GDP per capita growth on the initial level of GDP.  
 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
 
We find a tendency to divergence while pooling together all observations, when considering 
2000 as starting year. If we perform the same estimate considering the period 1999-2003, we find 
no significant coefficient for the initial level of GDP. Thus, we observe that the inclusion of year 
1999 seems to change significantly the results concerning patterns of growth. This supports the 
intuition that 1999 may be a peculiar year.
3 To better understand growth dynamics, we perform the 
same equation at State level. In this way, we can understand growth dynamics within States. Results 
are shown in Table 3. We observe that three types of situations occur. 
  
[insert Table 3 about here] 
 
We have a majority of State which show no significant pattern of convergence or divergence 
between their municipalities. Some States present instead a pattern of convergence among 
municipalities, while few other present divergence within themselves. Notably, among the States 
that show divergence we have the State of Rio de Janeiro. The coefficient of the initial level of 
income is positive, although not significant, also in Sao Paulo State. Thus, we seem to find some 
evidence of different patterns of growth between large metropolitan areas and their surrounding 
                                                 
2 Whit the exception of the correlation between the measure of social division and the indicator of religiousness, which 
are not significantly correlated.  
3 Performing the same type of regression over shorter type periods always produces a positive and significant 
coefficient for the initial level of GDP per capita. This coefficient is not significant only when considering 1999 as a 
starting year. located in the same State. Interestingly, if we shift the focus of our analysis, and look for the any 
pattern between States, we observe a tendency to convergence between States.  
 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Overall, we observe a general divergence between Brazilian municipalities. This pattern is 
stronger within some States, while in others there any clear tendency and in some others there is a 
tendency to convergence between municipalities located in the same State. Analysis at State level 
suggests instead that income levels of States are converging. This apparent contradiction can be 
explained in the light of the ecological fallacy and the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP). The 
first suggests that inference on characteristics of the individuals, based on aggregate statistics may 
lead to errors of interpretation, while the MAUP underlines that referring to aggregate zone which 
may be arbitrary in nature and could be a source of error in spatial studies. 
Moving to analysis of the role of social capital, we enrich our baseline estimate by adding a 
number of indicators. We observe in Table 5 that the factor that summarizes social cohesion has a 
positive and significant impact on growth rates of income per capita across all different 
specifications. 
 
[insert Table 5 about here] 
 
As predicted by the theory, social capital has a positive effect on growth rates. If we include a 
factor that summarises division within the society, or in other terms, lack of social capital, we 
observe that it has a negative impact on growth rates. The lack of religiousness has a negative 
impact, and this is coherent with the idea that religious institutions are one of the channels through 
which social capital grows. Our variable on murders results not significant. We would have 
expected a negative sign. We are quite safe that this is not due to problems of multicollinearity, as 
its correlation with the initial level of income is only 0.201. One could argue that murders are 
endogenous to GDP growth rates, but the correlation between our dependent variable and the factor 
that summarises murders is small in size and not significant. Our measure of murders thus seems to 
be safe from the risk of endogeneity. Finally, the variable the summarizes political participation has 
a negative and significant coefficient. We would have expected a positive impact of participation on 
growth rates, nonetheless, this result could depend on the peculiarity of Brazil. In this country, an 
increase in political participation could imply larger political instability, which in turn undermines 
growth rates.  We have seen that States have different patterns of growth within themselves, and we know that 
they are different, running from Amazonian states like Acre to the State of Rio de Janeiro, São 
Paulo or Distrito Federal. Therefore, we include in our analysis a set of State dummies, in order to 
control for spatial heterogeneity. Results are reported in Table 6. 
 
  [insert Table 6 about here] 
 
We observe that the results on the role of social capital are robust to the inclusion of State 
dummies. The goodness of fit of our estimates is improved, although we observe that the initial 






In this section we show that our results, as far as concerns the role of social capital, do not 
depend on the time period considered. We decide to implement our previous analysis starting from 
2000, due to the financial crisis of 1999. Table 7 shows the results of the same estimates 
considering the growth in income per capita over the period 1999-2003. We obtain again 
confirmation that social capital has a positive impact on growth rates.  
 
[insert Table 7 about here] 
 
All social capital variables maintain their sign and level of significance, while murders become 
negative and significant. The initial level of income per capita turn out to be significant and 
negative, thus suggesting a tendency to convergence. 
A further robusteness check concerns the choice of factor analysis. One could think that using 
the single variables that constitute a factor, instead of the factor itself, would produce the same 
result, with a more direct interpretation of the coefficient estimates.
4 We show that this is not true, 
thus reinforcing our choice of this methodology. As an example, we show different regression, 
using first our factor that summarizes the lack of religiousness, and then its four compoments. The 
first two enter in the factor with a negative factor loading, while the second two with a positive. We 
                                                 
4 We thank our discussant at II DYNREG Workshop for underlying this point.   would thus expect a positive sign for the coefficient estimate when considering the first two 
variables, and a negative sign for the second two.  
 
[insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Table 8 shows that this is not true, when considering civil weddings and couples which cohabit 
without wedding. This suggests that factor analysis is relevant in the sense that it does not simply 
“merge” different variables, but it captures underlying characteristics that these variables share.   
  
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The aim of the present work is to investigate the role of social capital in growth. We first 
review the literature on social capital, to draw some testable predictions. We test this prediction 
using a detailed dataset on Brazilian municipalities, finding evidence of the positive impact of 
social capital on growth rates. This result is robust to the inclusion of State dummies, and to the 
time period considered. We focus our analysis on the period 2000-2003, but we show that the 
inclusion of year 1999 does not change the results concerning social capital.  
This is interesting as it allows us to affirm that social capital has a positive effect on growth 
rate, independently from the economic cycle. The financial crisis of 1999 does not alter the role of 
social capital in our growth estimates.     
This works suggests that governments should aim at promoting social capital, as it has a 
positive effect on economic growth. Policies that promote social cohesion and increase 
associationism (which in our work is proxied by the relevance of the religiousness, and the 
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Appendix A 
Variables Employed in Factor Analysis 
•  social cohesion: number of cohabiting individuals over total population, number of married 
individuals over total population, number of married cohabiting individuals over total 
population, number of divorced cohabiting individuals over total population, number of 
widow cohabiting individuals over total population, number of single cohabiting individuals 
over total population 
•  social division: number of separated individuals over total population, number of separated 
cohabiting individuals over total population, number of separated not cohabiting individuals 
over total population, number of divorced individuals over total population, number of 
divorced cohabiting individuals over total population, number of divorced not cohabiting 
individuals over total population •  no religion: number of civil and church weddings over total population, number of civil 
weddings over total population, number of  church weddings over total population, number 
of cohabiting individuals over total population 
•  murders: murders per capita over different time periods ranging from 1989 to 1999  
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Figure 1: Kernel densities of GDP per capita growth over the period 2000-2003, by State 
 
social cohesion social division no religion murders political partecipation
social cohesion 1
social division 0.519*** 1
no religion -0.255*** -0.015 1
murders -0.040***  0.234*** 0.086*** 1
political partecipation 0.621*** 0.424*** -0.228*** -0.074*** 1
 
Table 1: Correlations between Factors    
Dep. Var: GDP p.c.  Dep. Var: GDP p.c. 
Growth (1999-2003) Growth (2000-2003)
GDP p.c.1999 0.000388 GDP p.c.2000 0.0426***
(0.0055) (0.0050)
Constant 0.467*** Constant 0.0317
(0.044) (0.040)
Observations 5507 Observations 5507
R-squared 0.00 R-squared 0.01
 









Espírito Santo 0.166 (0.073)**
Goiás 0.060 (0.026)**
Maranhão -0.031 (0.059)
Mato Grosso 0.114 (0.043)**
Mato Grosso do Sul -0.003 (0.042)






Rio Grande do Norte -0.056 (0.028)*
Rio Grande do Sul -0.070 (0.031)**
Rio de Janeiro 0.174 (0.077)**
Rondônia -0.383 (0.125)***
Roraima -0.191 (0.121)
Santa Catarina -0.062 (0.029)**
Sergipe 0.265 (0.109)**
São Paulo 0.018 (0.022)
Tocantins -0.090 (0.056)
 
Table 3: Convergence within States 









Table 4: Convergence between States 
 
Dep. Var: GDP p.c. Growth 
GDP p.c.2000 0.0426*** 0.0165** 0.0414*** 0.0328*** 0.0316*** 0.0438***
(0.0050) (0.0064) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0077)
social cohesion 0.0313*** 0.0406*** 0.0360*** 0.0370*** 0.0539***
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0059)
social division -0.0410*** -0.0350*** -0.0357*** -0.0306***
(0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0052)






constant 0.0317 0.243*** 0.0411 0.111* 0.121** 0.0192
(0.040) (0.052) (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.063)
State dummies No No No No No No
Observations 5507 5507 5507 5507 5507 4925
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
 
Table 5: The Role of Social Capital 
 Dep. Var: GDP p.c. Growth 
GDP p.c.2000 -0.00712 -0.0103 0.00315 0.00235 0.00149 0.00675
(0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0078)
social cohesion 0.0162*** 0.0200*** 0.0205*** 0.0224*** 0.0252***
(0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0067)
social division -0.0422*** -0.0402*** -0.0411*** -0.0396***
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0052)






constant 0.537*** 0.590*** 0.458*** 0.463*** 0.474*** 0.422***
(0.075) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.081)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5507 5507 5507 5507 5507 4925
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27
 
Table 6: The Role of Social Capital, controlling for Spatial Heterogeneity 
 
Dep. Var: GDP p.c. Growth (1999-2003)
GDP p.c.1999 -0.0684*** -0.0733*** -0.0584*** -0.0592*** -0.0575*** -0.0453***
(0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0089)
social cohesion 0.0261*** 0.0300*** 0.0305*** 0.0277*** 0.0241***
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0077)
social disgregation -0.0446*** -0.0426*** -0.0412*** -0.0423***
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0061)






Constant 0.930*** 1.013*** 0.867*** 0.873*** 0.854*** 0.744***
(0.087) (0.089) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.094)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5507 5507 5507 5507 5507 4925
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22
 
Table 7: Robustness: Different Time Period Dep. Var: GDP p.c. Growth 
GDP p.c.2000 0.0318*** 0.0226*** 0.0498*** 0.0423*** 0.0428***
(0.0051) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0050) (0.0050)
no religion -0.0531***
(0.0067)
civil and church weddings  0.269***
(0.043)
church weddings  0.304**
(0.15)
civil weddings  -0.0832
(0.12)
cohabiting not married 0.0982
(0.082)
constant 0.119*** 0.133*** -0.0351 0.0388 0.0204
(0.041) (0.043) (0.052) (0.042) (0.041)
State dummies No No No No No
Observations 5507 5507 5507 5507 5507
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
 
Table 8: Robustness: Decomposition of Factors 